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Abstract 8 
In recent years, the issue of food fraud has become both widely discussed within the food industry 9 
and seemingly more prevalent, with incidents happening worldwide. The purpose of this study was 10 
to investigate the use of different types of anti-fraud tools within the UK food industry. The study 11 
utilised an online survey questionnaire and food manufacturing companies were invited to 12 
participate in the study via email and calls for participation through industry networks i.e. Food 13 
Integrity Intelligence Network (FIIN), the Federation of Bakers and the Food and Drink Federation. 14 
Nineteen food manufacturers returned the completed survey. Of the food businesses surveyed, 15 
most used their own in-house food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) tools followed by the 16 
Campden Threat Assessment and Critical Control Point (TACCP). Campden TACCP is the evaluation of 17 
threats, identification of vulnerabilities and implementation of controls of the entire production 18 
process. The threats controlled by TACCP include economically motivated adulteration (EMA) and 19 
malicious contamination. Around one third of the companies reported being victims of food fraud. 20 
Food manufacturers were divided about the impact of conducting food fraud vulnerability 21 
assessments. Half of the food manufacturers were optimistic about the impact of FFVA whilst the 22 
rest were uncertain or negative. Positive impacts include raising awareness and ensuring integrity of 23 
food supply chain whilst negative views were associated with cost and concerns for brand 24 
reputation. The adoption and conduct of FFVA is still at its infancy and the full impact remains to be 25 
seen. However, with time and constant vigilance from the food industry, FFVA will benefit the sector 26 
and the safety and integrity of the food supply chain.   27 
  28 
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 30 
Highlights 31 
 One third of surveyed food manufacturers were victims of food fraud 32 
 Most food manufacturers used their own in-house food fraud vulnerability assessment tools 33 
 47% were positive about impact of conducting food fraud vulnerability assessments 34 
 35 
Introduction 36 
Food fraud is a purposive act of substitution, addition, tampering or misrepresentation of food, food 37 
ingredients or food packaging and is carried out for the purpose of economic gain (Spink and Moyer, 38 
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2011). Although food fraud detection and preventative measures have been developed and are 39 
being implemented throughout the food supply chain (SSAFE, 2018; van Ruth et al., 2017), food 40 
fraud cases are still reported globally. Recent cases include dilution of maple syrup with cheaper 41 
table sugar (EC 2018), substitution of premium fish with other species (Xiong et al., 2018), 42 
mislabelling of seafood (Pardo et al., 2018), repackaging rice with new expiry dates (Mutuko, 2018) 43 
and mixing groundnuts with stones and gravel (Food Fraud Risk Information, 2018). The agri-food 44 
industry needs to be constantly vigilant to protect the integrity of the food supply chain. The Elliot 45 
Review proposed the implementation of a national food crime framework in the United Kingdom 46 
after the 2013 horsemeat scandal (Elliott Review, 2014) leading to the introduction of the National 47 
Food Crime Unit (NFCU). In addition to international and national preventative measures, supply 48 
chains and individual food businesses must be prepared to mitigate, and where possible prevent, 49 
food fraud from occurring. Everstine (2013) highlighted the need for a holistic and systematic 50 
approach to mitigate food fraud via appropriate risk assessment techniques and use of historical 51 
data sources and/or intelligence.  52 
 53 
Research to date has tended to focus on analytical methods to detect food fraud. A number of 54 
excellent reviews on analytical techniques on both targeted (i.e. where compound of interest is 55 
known) and non-targeted methods (e.g. screening) have been published (Abbas et al., 2018; Esteki 56 
et al., 2018; Valdes et al., 2018).  The perceived increased prevalence of food fraud has also renewed 57 
interest in consumer studies. For example, studies on attitudes and perceptions towards food fraud 58 
and consumers’ confidence in the food industry have been conducted in Bangladesh (Nasreen and 59 
Ahmed, 2014), China (El Benni et al., 2019; Kendall et al., 2018a, b), the UK and EU (Barnett et al., 60 
2016; Charlebois et al., 2016; Van Rijswijk and Frewer, 2012) and Brazil (Breitenbach et al., 2018).  61 
 62 
Conventional risk assessments are based on known criteria: the hazard (agent that can cause harm 63 
or substitution); the severity (degree of harm including financial or economic penalty) of the hazard 64 
if it occurs; and the likelihood (frequency) of the hazard to occur. Traditionally, food contaminants 65 
(biological, chemical and physical agents that can cause harm), food allergens and food quality issues 66 
are assessed independently but there is a need to consider risks in a more holistic approach 67 
(Manning and Soon, 2016). In addition, food safety management systems are developed to manage 68 
traditional food safety hazards and are not specifically designed for food fraud prevention and 69 
control (van Ruth et al., 2017). However, there has been a move to incorporate risk assessments or 70 
food fraud vulnerability assessments within third-party industry food safety and quality standards 71 
(e.g. Global Standard for food safety, version 8, BRC 2018), requiring the food industry to identify 72 
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weaknesses and/or criticalities within their processing facilities or supply chains. Fraud vulnerability 73 
is a weakness or flaw in the system that creates opportunities for fraudsters to take advantage of. It 74 
is defined by three key fraud drivers i.e. opportunities, motivations and control measures (Spink, 75 
Ortega, Chen, & Wu, 2017; van Ruth et al., 2017).  76 
 77 
A number of risk assessments centred around fraud and food integrity issues have been developed 78 
in recent years. Table 1 shows the various definitions of food fraud and defence. Campden Threat 79 
Assessment and Critical Control Point (TACCP) is defined by PAS 96:2017 as the ‘systematic 80 
management of risk through the evaluation of threats, identification of vulnerabilities and 81 
implementation of controls of the entire production process’. The threats controlled by TACCP 82 
include economically motivated adulteration (EMA) and malicious contamination, extortion, 83 
espionage, counterfeiting and cybercrime. TACCP is focused on identifying specific threats of 84 
criminal and malicious activity that can impact food safety (Campden BRI, 2019; Swainson, 2019). It 85 
follows the principles of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) and requires users to 86 
assemble a TACCP team, define the scope of study, review current TACCP measures, threat 87 
characterisation, mitigation strategy development, horizon scanning for new or emerging threats, 88 
implementation, recording and documentation and audit / review (Campden BRI, 2019). Questions 89 
and considerations in TACCP are detailed for the product, premises and the business including 90 
personnel security, controlling access to premises, services, processes and materials and secure 91 
storage of transport vehicles (Campden BRI, 2019). 92 
 93 
Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Point (VACCP) is used in conjunction with TACCP. It is 94 
an inter-related process used to consider how vulnerable each point in the food process is to a 95 
particular criminal or malicious activity (Campden BRI, 2019; Swainson, 2019). However, according to 96 
GFSI (2017), TACCP and VACCP are defined separately. TACCP which evaluates threats is a ‘process 97 
to ensure the security of food and drink from intentional malicious attack including ideologically 98 
motivated attack leading to contamination’ (Table 1). Vulnerability is more of a state of being that 99 
could lead to an incident (Spink, 2014). VACCP focuses on susceptibility or exposure to food fraud. Its 100 
scope includes systematic prevention of potential adulteration of food – this could be intentional or 101 
not, via identification of vulnerable points in the supply chain (Global Food Safety Resource, 2019).  102 
 103 




In the United States of America, Spink et al. (2016) developed the Food Fraud Initial Screening Model 106 
(FFISM) where users can review previous incidents and suspicious activities, assess risks and 107 
prioritise their resources. Since FFISM is an initial screening tool, it allows for product groups with 108 
lower risks or established controls to be removed from subsequent vulnerability assessment, 109 
enabling companies to focus more specifically on higher risks. FFISM complements other assessment 110 
tool such as the Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE). Its versatility and free 111 
accessibility allows users to assess vulnerabilities for different products, business size and region of 112 
operation (SSAFE, 2018).  113 
 114 
It is noted that risk assessment continues to be the key step to identify food safety issues including 115 
fraud. The spice industry have tested vulnerability assessment tools such as the SSAFE, identifying 116 
the spice chain as being of medium vulnerability to food fraud (Silvis et al., 2017). The dairy sector 117 
too have utilised the SSAFE food fraud assessment tool and identified the Dutch milk supply chain as 118 
having low to medium vulnerability to fraud (Yang et al. in press).  Van Ruth et al. (2018) assessed a 119 
number of other supply chains (fish, meat, dairy, olive oil and organic bananas) and found that 120 
opportunities and motivations to commit fraud remain key fraud drivers in the food supply chain. It 121 
is estimated that fraud costs the UK food economy £11 billion a year but this is only the tip of the 122 
iceberg as fraud is massively underreported. By preventing fraud in food supply chain it is possible to 123 
reduce these estimated costs. In fact, by tackling fraud, this could boost the UK food industry’s profit 124 
by £4.5 billion (Fraud Review Team, 2006; White 2017). However, to date, there is very little 125 
information regarding the number of reported frauds committed in the food industry or number of 126 
food industry / supply chain victimised by fraud. As fraud is not a policing priority this has resulted in 127 
substantial numbers of un-investigated cases (Doig, 2018).   A culture within the food industry that 128 
questions the source of its supply chain and wider food integrity should be encouraged. A growing 129 
body of research has already focused on the detection of adulterated food products, analytical 130 
techniques and identifying vulnerable points in the food supply chain. What is not clear is the extent 131 
and usage of food fraud vulnerability assessments in the food supply chain. What type of assessment 132 
tools have been adopted by the food industry to mitigate food fraud? What actions are taken 133 
following such assessments? Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate the use of food fraud 134 
vulnerability assessment tools and subsequent actions taken by the food industry. 135 
 136 
Methodology 137 
Questionnaire Development 138 
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The research utilised an online survey questionnaire, which was made available via SurveyMonkey®.   139 
Questions were developed from the current literature (Barnett et al., 2016; DEFRA, 2015; Menozzi et 140 
al. 2015; Rhodes, 2016) with the questionnaire being divided into six sections; (i) demographic 141 
characteristics; (ii) level of understanding of risk of food fraud; (iii) food fraud vulnerability 142 
assessments and tools used; (iv) actions taken following assessments; and (v) training.  143 
A pilot study among food fraud researchers and two food manufacturers was conducted to ensure 144 
the clarity and validity of the questionnaire and evaluate the time required to complete it.  145 
 146 
Participant Recruitment 147 
Food manufacturing companies were invited to participate in the study via email and calls for 148 
participation through a number of industry networks including the Food Integrity Intelligence 149 
Network (FIIN), the Federation of Bakers and the Food and Drink Federation between May and 150 
August 2017. The first and second authors also visited exhibition booths at Food Ingredients Europe 151 
(FIE) and Food and Drink Expo in November 2017 and April 2018 respectively, to garner further 152 
participation.  A total of 23 food companies responded to these approaches and nineteen food 153 
manufacturers returned completed surveys.  154 
 155 
Results and Discussion 156 
The survey participants represented a wide cross-section of manufacturers within the food and drink 157 
industry.   As shown in Table 2,  36.8% of the manufacturers represented small and medium sized 158 
independent food business (companies operating with less than 50 employees), 26.3% represented 159 
medium sized firms with  50 – 249 employees). Whilst all of the main product categories were 160 
represented in the survey (meat and fish; dairy and egg; fruits, vegetables and nuts; alcoholic drinks, 161 
bakery; ready meals and sandwiches; dried foods and ingredients), 31.6% of the study population 162 
classified their products as ‘others’, which encompassed a mixture of raw and cooked products, wet 163 
and dehydrated culinary products, marinades, meals for catering services, and honey.  164 
 165 
About 1/3 of the manufacturers reported that their food businesses had been victims of food fraud. 166 
Nine of the manufacturers (just under half of those surveyed) had experience of dealing with 167 
external fraud, i.e. where a business is a victim of fraud perpetrated by an external third party (e.g. 168 
by supply of inferior, substituted or adulterated foods, theft etc.), whilst six food businesses 169 
(approximately 1/3) reported experiences in dealing with internal food fraud. Internal fraud occurs 170 
at the place of employment, either as an individual acting alone or in collaboration with the modus 171 
operandi of the organisation. Internal staff have more access to processing facilities compared to 172 
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external staff and as they understand the controls and preventive measures in place, may be  able to 173 
work around them falsifying documentation if necessary (Manning and Soon, 2016). It is most likely 174 
that the external fraud occurred at the suppliers, sector or wider chain level and were detected 175 
before the manufacturing companies themselves became direct victims of fraud. This fits with 176 
previous research, as Van Ruth et al. (2017) reported that food frauds may originate from both the 177 
external or internal environment of a business. The findings however do not indicate if internal fraud 178 
is more easilycommitted compared to external fraud. It is possible that external frauds were 179 
identified and reported more frequently due to less stringent control and preventive measures 180 
(Manning, 2016), increased awareness of food fraud in the supply chain and / or perceived control 181 
over internal control measures.  This is akin to an ‘It won’t happen to us’ answer when people are 182 
questioned about the likelihood of being affected by harm or food fraud in this case (da Cunha, 183 
Stedefeldt, & de Rosso, 2014; Weinstein, 1984).  184 
 185 
Over 40% of the manufacturers stated that their businesses have designated staff who could advise 186 
on preventative and counter-fraud strategies, however, it is not known if these individuals are 187 
trained counter-fraud specialists. Whilst fraud analysts and investigators are often employed in 188 
banking, benefits, property claims and financial organisations, there are few reports of specialised 189 
counter-fraud staff being employed within the food industry.  Within the enforcement community 190 
there have been moves to establish specialist teams to address food fraud and food crime.  For 191 
example, the Danish Veterinary and Food Agency (DVFA) employs a “Food Fraud Flying Squad”; the 192 
Food and Consumer Products Safety Authority in the Netherlands have established an Intelligence 193 
and Investigation Service (IOD), and in the UK the National Food Crime Unit (NFCU) has been 194 
established within the Food Standards Agency (FSA) in the aftermath of the horsemeat scandal.  All 195 
three agencies employ experts in criminal investigations, alongside individuals with the traditional 196 
scientific expertise (veterinary science, microbiology, food science etc.) associated with these 197 
agencies, with the aim of enabling comprehensive investigations into suspected food crime and food 198 
fraud (Evershed and Temple, 2016; NVWA-IOD, 2018). In fact, the NFCU are boosting their staff 199 
number from 22 to 80 to enhance their capabilities in addressing complex food crime (FSA, n.d.; 200 
Ridler, 2018).  201 
 202 
More than half of the businesses surveyed also have a specific policy on fraud prevention, 203 
investigation and reporting in place. Such policies can serve as a beneficial guide for companies 204 




Insert Table 2 here 207 
 208 
As shown in Table 3, more than half of the businesses surveyed report using bespoke in-house tools 209 
for food fraud assessment. Based on their responses, these tools were adapted from United States 210 
Pharmacopeia (USP) and Campden TACCP guidelines. One organisation developed their own model 211 
in line with the National Intelligence model whilst considering their historical data, information from 212 
external sources and experts. Another, a cooked meat and fish products manufacturing company, 213 
designed their system based on their own experience and advice from industry experts, as well as 214 
utilising information from the FSA and UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 215 
(DEFRA) websites. Slightly more than a quarter of the food businesses surveyed adopted the 216 
Campden TACCP guidelines (which evaluates threats from food fraud and malicious contamination) 217 
directly, whilst two companies used the SSAFE tool. No organisations reported using USP or FFISM in 218 
their original formats.  This may be because the companies surveyed are UK-based and so lack 219 
exposure to the tools developed in the U.S. It is also possible that tools from different countries 220 
collate historical fraud incidents related to the region and so best cater to the needs of the local food 221 
industry. Some of the manufacturers reported using analytical authenticity tests as a form of in-222 
house assessment tool. For example, a honey processing company utilised a Unique Manuka Factor 223 
(UMF) grading system, whilst a dairy and liquid egg company utilised isotope spectrometer analysis. 224 
GFSI assessments of both food defence and food fraud are carried out separately unlike Campden 225 
TACCP which can assess both criminal activity from fraud and malicious attack.  226 
 227 
Insert Table 3 here 228 
 229 
The main sources of information used by the food industry to support food fraud assessments were 230 
their own internal experts, guidelines provided by the different assessment methods, food safety 231 
certification bodies and professional memberships. Professional memberships such as the 232 
Federation of Bakers, Food and Drink Federation, Institute of Food Science and Technology, Institute 233 
of Food Technologists and the International Association for Food Protection provide networking 234 
opportunities and updates to members. Networking is one of the key information and knowledge 235 
sharing strategies employed by the food industry, especially in the area of open innovation (OI) 236 
(Bigliardi and Galati, 2013). Similarly, the food industry can create and share intelligence of food 237 
fraud incidents and mitigation strategies using these networks. For example, ESA (2018) and van 238 
Ruth et al. (2017) reported that companies that participated in European Spice Association meetings 239 
were warned about fraud and received an “adulteration awareness document”.  Desouza et al. 240 
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(2005) found that organisations that do not utilise external knowledge are unable to compete in the 241 
marketplace in an effective way. Other sources of information include Food Industry Intelligence 242 
Network (FIIN), HorizonScan, suppliers and customers. Suppliers may be valuable sources of 243 
information as they have specific knowledge of the product and there is the opportunity for 244 
reciprocity in knowledge sharing between suppliers and buyers which can benefit both parties. 245 
(Török et al., in press). Similarly, customers too can potentially provide information about fraud 246 
incidents that have occurred. Information and knowledge sharing, together with collaborations with 247 
other actors in the supply chain, may be effective ways to reduce vulnerability to food fraud.   248 
 249 
The majority of the companies in the survey carry out food fraud assessment training i.e. how to 250 
assess fraud vulnerability specific to their products and processes (79%) and internal control 251 
measures (63%). Control measures are actions taken to minimise, reduce or eliminate potential 252 
hazards from occurring (Wallace et al., 2011). Although the use of control measures to minimise and 253 
where possible eliminate the likelihood of unintentional food safety incidents is well established 254 
through the use of HACCP and pre-requisite programmes, the consideration of food fraud (i.e. 255 
intentional acts committed for financial gain) does not sit within the scope of traditional HACCP-256 
based food safety management systems. Therefore, food businesses must consider additional 257 
internal control measures to minimise the likelihood of food fraud. For example, control measures 258 
can be currently built into product and packaging design via information systems for traceability, 259 
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID), codes, tamper evident seals, holograms and special 260 
inks (Manning et al., 2016; Spink et al. 2010). Furthermore, intelligent packaging devices i.e. sensors, 261 
indicators and radio frequency identification (RFID), are expanding in response to food fraud, 262 
counterfeit, theft, diversion, safety, quality and reuse / recycling (Vanderroost et al., 2017a; 263 
Vanderoost et al., 2017b). Other control measures specific to fraud include whistleblowing 264 
guidelines (Soon and Manning, 2017), contractual requirements for suppliers (van Ruth et al. 2017), 265 
employee integrity screening and ethical codes of conduct (PWC, 2016). Capacity building in 266 
laboratory and analytical testing method remains crucial to ensure staff are competent and kept 267 
updated with current methods.  268 
Interestingly, a small number of the surveyed food businesses had staff trained in forensic 269 
accounting. According to Power (2013) and Gee et al. (2014), forensic accounting has been adopted 270 
as a countermeasure to fraud to fight the practice of “false” suppliers as well as fraudulent practices 271 
by internal company staff (e.g. approval of false invoices, falsification delivery notes). Other flags for 272 
fraud that can be identified by forensic audit include false traceability documentation, missing 273 
paperwork, prices below commodity price, several similar purchases made below an authorisation 274 
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level, high volumes of purchases from new vendors and excessive cash receipts/payments. The “Red 275 
Flags of Food Fraud” set out in the Elliott Review indicate the use of observation skills and forensic 276 
accounting techniques to reduce fraud vulnerability (Jack, in Elliott Review, 2014). Traceability tests 277 
and second party audits will also provide more information for focused forensic accounting. Indeed, 278 
it was a recommendation of the Elliott Review (2014) that the UK government should “support the 279 
work of standards’ owners in developing additional audit modules for food fraud prevention and 280 
detection incorporating forensic accountancy and mass balance checks.” 281 
 282 
The food businesses were also questioned on their actions if their suppliers are suspected of 283 
perpetrating fraud.  More than half would choose to delist their suppliers in combination with other 284 
methods including thorough investigation and supplier audits. Delisting an offending supplier may 285 
have a negative impact on production (e.g. the availability of ingredients) and the action is also 286 
dependent on whether the suppliers were directly involved in the fraud or were victims themselves. 287 
If suppliers have been victims of fraud due to lack of appropriate control measures in place, the 288 
manufacturers are willing to work with them to eliminate and/or reduce fraud vulnerability (Table 289 
4).  The findings from this study revealed that the decision to delist suppliers was also dependent on 290 
frequency of fraud i.e. if the issue occurred more than once.  291 
 292 
Insert Table 4 here 293 
 294 
A large proportion of the participating companies have had no non-conformances raised in external 295 
audits against food fraud vulnerability clauses. The four companies that reported non-conformances 296 
had either used their own fraud assessment tools or the SSAFE tool. This does not mean that other 297 
tools are better in assessing vulnerability points. One must bear in mind that different tools provide 298 
different functionality and is up to the company to adapt the tool accordingly i.e. adapt to own 299 
product or sector, process and region. BRC Global Standard for Food Safety Issue 8 requires food 300 
manufacturers to carry out a documented vulnerability assessment on food raw materials to assess 301 
potential risk of adulteration or substitution (BRC Global Standards, 2018) but the methodology of 302 
assessment is up to the manufacturers. The key challenge with food fraud vulnerability assessment 303 
is inconsistency, as multiple tools could be used, and the scope of assessments may vary 304 
(Whitworth, 2015) hence there is the risk of under or over predicting vulnerability points within the 305 




Food companies also reported utilising a number of strategies following food fraud risk assessment 308 
(qualitative responses to an open-ended question on ‘What actions are taken by your company 309 
following food fraud risk assessment?’). These include routine surveillance analysis, supplier checks, 310 
site visits, traceability checks and specific full-on investigation in the case of known or suspected 311 
food fraud. In fact, one of the companies successfully recalled two containers of adulterated 312 
products en-route to their client and tightened their sourcing security and internal audits with their 313 
suppliers. Another company suggested that end consumers (i.e. public shoppers) must be educated 314 
as customers are the key drivers of safe and integrity products in the food supply chain.  315 
 316 
The respondents were divided in terms of whether food fraud vulnerability assessments have a 317 
positive or negative impact on food fraud (Table 4). Those who perceived that the tools have a 318 
positive impact related this to putting an increased focus on an area that was not always considered 319 
properly, raising general awareness and ensuring that customers are getting what is labelled. The 320 
tools are believed to serve as an ongoing deterrent and preventative measure.  321 
 322 
However, across the surveyed companies, there is still a level of uncertainty in terms of the impact 323 
of the tools.  In response to the question: ‘In your opinion, have food fraud vulnerability assessments 324 
had a positive / negative impact on food fraud?’ one user was uncertain about the impact from such 325 
assessment tool and commented on the questions used in fraud assessment tool:  326 
 327 
 ‘Why should we ask if the organisation owner is a celebrity? Assessments are very 328 
subjective. Unfortunately, a box ticking exercise by staff who are unaware of suppliers’ 329 
reliability and how trustworthy they are, will be useless’.  330 
 331 
Threat assessments for an organisation requires one to determine if the organisation has a celebrity 332 
or high-profile chief executive or proprietor (PAS 96:2017). This assessment allows one to assess for 333 
likelihood of threats and/or level of vulnerability to deliberate contamination of food by malicious or 334 
begrudged perpetrators against the owner. It is crucial that users understand why such assessments 335 
are required.  336 
 337 
Two of the surveyed food businesses perceived a negative impact from the assessments, as they 338 
incur additional costs and may provide a bad image to the brand.  339 
 340 




In general the surveyed food businesses agreed that food fraud vulnerability assessments can help 343 
to ensure food integrity, deter potential fraud risk and create an anti-fraud culture (Table 5). Food 344 
chain integrity covers all aspects of food chain from producers to consumers and encompasses 345 
microbial and chemical food safety, authenticity, fraud and quality (Hoorfar et al., 2011). Food 346 
manufacturers are one of the key actors in the chain and with appropriate control measures such as 347 
use of food fraud vulnerability assessment, can reduce opportunity for fraud.  According to van Ruth 348 
et al. (2017), food fraud vulnerability is dependent on opportunities to commit fraud, motivations of 349 
fraudsters and control measures in place, whilst Moyer et al. (2017) suggest that fraudsters are 350 
unlikely to engage in illegal activity if they perceive the chance of being caught high Conducting 351 
assessments allows users to identify  points of vulnerability, review their control measures and as a 352 
result of the ongoing assessment, this can help to reduce and/or deter fraud opportunities and 353 
demotivate fraudsters from taking action. Establishing the correct ethical standards, creating 354 
appropriate management support and environment for food businesses are also an important part 355 
of creating an anti-fraud culture.  A strong ethical standards culture will encourage employees to 356 
adhere to the organisations’ rules and regulations (Rae and Subramaniam, 2008) and limits the risk 357 
of unethical behaviour (van Ruth et al., 2017).  People are governed by the culture and environment 358 
in which they operate. In fact, an unethical business culture that encourages law breaking in the 359 
pursuit of profit can “normalize” fraud and reinforce longer-term fraudulent activity (Coleman, 1987; 360 
Raftery and Holder, 2014).  361 
 362 
The respondents mostly agreed that they have stronger internal controls (e.g. control measures 363 
within organisation; own staff) compared to external controls (e.g. third party audits; inspections)  364 
over the application of food fraud vulnerability assessment. They believed that their own staff will 365 
be able to carry out the assessment and the control measures within their facilities can prevent food 366 
fraud. Meanwhile, there was more uncertainty about government and external inspectors’ role in 367 
preventing food fraud. Previous research has revealed diminished public confidence in the 368 
government and food industry following the horsemeat incident (Barnett et al., 2016; Elliott Review, 369 
2014; Premanandh, 2013; Tse et al., 2016). Consumers were found to be less tolerant of uncertainty 370 
due to lack of action or lack of interest from the government (Frewer et al., 2002). Although internal 371 
control measures are crucial, regulatory controls are necessary to enforce food safety regulations 372 
(FSA, 2018a).   Some studies have demonstrated that regulatory control and official inspections help 373 
to reduce food fraud (Liu, 2016; Nasreen and Ahmed 2014). The UK FSA is modernising the way food 374 
businesses are regulated under the ‘Regulating our Future’ (ROF) programme (FSA, 2018b). A new 375 
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risk management approach will be introduced where food businesses doing the right thing will be 376 
recognised but action will be taken against those that do not. The ROF programme is timely as it 377 
needs to address the changing nature of the food industry (e.g. rise in online retailers, food delivery 378 
services, private auditors), constrained enforcement resources and environmental changes with 379 
preparations to leave the European Union (FSA, 2017).  380 
 381 
There is also strong agreement to continue with the current food fraud risk assessment model and 382 
the food businesses agreed that they will search for more information to support the assessment. 383 
For example, information developed by the British Standards Institution such as the PAS 2017 Guide 384 
to protecting and defending food and drink from deliberate attack (FSA, 2018c; PAS 96: 2017) can be 385 
used by food businesses to assess potential vulnerabilities to fraud.  386 
 387 
Limitations and future research 388 
The small sample size and low response rate from the food industry are major limitations in the 389 
study. Despite assurances of anonymity and confidentiality businesses appear reluctant to 390 
communicate their actions – or lack of them – in tackling this sensitive issue. There is also a 391 
possibility of social desirability bias in the responses received, as manufacturers may want to project 392 
an optimistic perspective of their activities.  Further insight could be obtained through interviews 393 
with individual food companies to explore the benefits and challenges in using the current food 394 
fraud vulnerability assessment tools. Future research should also explore why companies prefer to 395 
use in-house models and whether there is a restriction in terms of time, expertise and capital to 396 
subscribe to online food fraud vulnerability assessment tools? It is also worth exploring in-depth the 397 
companies that have been victims of internal and/or external fraud. Van Ruth et al. (2017) indicated 398 
that companies who have been victims of fraud are more likely to become indirectly involved in 399 
future frauds again. In fact, repeat victimization could occur if vulnerabilities were not mitigated 400 
after the first event.   401 
 402 
Conclusion 403 
In house food fraud vulnerability assessments were the preferred models of assessment among the 404 
surveyed food businesses. Around one third of the companies had been victims of food fraud, 405 
although about half of the companies have had experience in dealing with external food fraud. Food 406 
manufacturers were divided about the impact of conducting food fraud vulnerability assessments. 407 
Although such assessments are believed to help to raise awareness and ensure the integrity of the 408 
food supply chain, some food businesses are still uncertain about the impact of food fraud 409 
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vulnerability assessments, with concerns raised about cost and brand reputation. Since the adoption 410 
and conduct of the vulnerability assessments is fairly new, it is inevitable that the full impact remains 411 
to be seen. With time and ongoing vigilance from the food industry, food fraud vulnerability 412 
assessments will benefit the sector and ensure the safety and integrity of the food supply chain. 413 
Looking beyond the scope of the current study, future research could investigate the relation 414 
between demographic characteristics, experience in dealing with fraud, cultural differences and 415 
their food fraud vulnerability assessment strategies. Longitudinal studies with food manufacturers to 416 
assess the impact of such assessments will quantify the extent and type of impacts e.g. food safety, 417 
public health, finance and brand reputation.  418 
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Table 1. Food safety standards and definitions of food fraud and food defence 685 
Standards Food fraud Food defence Notes 
BRC Global Standard for 




assessment shall be 
carried out on all food 
raw materials to 
assess potential risk 
of adulteration 









4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) 
Food processing sites 
are looking at 




Food Fraud as the 
methodology and 








GFSI (2017) Process to ensure the 
security of food and 












food, food ingredients 
or food packaging, 
labelling, product 
information or false 
or misleading 
statements made 
about a product for 
economic gain that 
could impact 
consumer health 
Essential to note that 
GFSI defines food 
fraud separately from 
food defence 
PAS96:2017 Dishonest act or 
omission, relating to 
the production or 
supply of food, which 
is intended for 
personal gain or to 
cause loss to another 
party 
Procedures adopted 
to assure the security 
of food and drink and 
their supply chains 








(Campden BRI, 2019; 
Swainson, 2019) 
Systematic management of risk through the 
evaluation of threats, identification of 
vulnerabilities and implementation of controls 
Note that Spink and 
Moyer (2011) suggest 
that food defence 
activities are distinct 
from food fraud. Food 
defence strategies are 
efforts undertaken to 
Campden VACCP 
(Campden BRI, 2019; 
Swainson, 2019) 
Consider how vulnerable each point in the 
supply chain is to that threat of 
criminal/malicious activity. VACCP is an inter-
related process with TACCP 
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protect food from 
intentional acts of 
adulteration.  
US FDA (2018)  Effort to protect food 
from intentional acts 
of adulteration where 
there is an intent to 
cause wide scale 




Table 2. Demographic characteristics of survey participants (n=19) 688 
Variable Items Frequency (%) 
Gender Male 11 (57.9) 
 Female 8 (42.1) 
   
Age (years) 18-30 2 (10.5) 
 31-40 6 (31.6) 
 41-50 3 (15.8) 
 51-60 5 (26.3) 
 > 60 3 (15.8) 
   
Education Secondary 3 (15.8) 
 Tertiary 16 (84.2) 
   
Food and drink manufacturing type Raw fish products and 
preparations 
1 (5.3) 
 Fruit, vegetables and nuts 1 (5.3) 
 Dairy, liquid egg 2 (10.5) 
 Cooked meat / fish 
products 
1 (5.3) 
 Ready meals and 
sandwiches 
1 (5.3) 




 Bakery 2 (10.5) 
 Dried foods and 
ingredients 
3 (15.8) 
 Others 6 (31.6) 
   
Number of employees 0 – 9  4 (21.1) 
 10 – 49 3 (15.8) 
 50 – 249  5 (26.3) 
 250+ employees 7 (36.8) 
21 
 
   
Independent / multinational company Independent 13 (68.4) 
 Multinational 6 (31.6) 
   
Has the company been a victim of food fraud? Yes 6 (31.6) 
 No 11 (57.9) 
 Uncertain 2 (10.5) 
   
I have  experience dealing with internal food 
fraud 
Yes 6 (31.6) 
 No 11 (57.9) 
 Uncertain 2 (10.5) 
   
I have experience dealing with external food 
fraud 
Yes 9 (47.4) 
 No 9 (47.4) 
 Prefer not to say 1 (5.3) 
   
   
Does the company have a designated individual / 
fraud officer to advice on fraud incidents? 
Yes 8 (42.1) 
 No 10 (52.6) 
 Uncertain 1 (5.3) 
   
Does your company have a specific policy on 
fraud prevention, investigation and reporting? 
Yes 10 (52.6) 
 No 7 (36.8) 
 Uncertain 2 (10.5) 
   
 689 
 690 
Table 3. Types of food fraud assessment tools, resources and training conducted in food businesseS 691 
Items Frequency (%) 
Campden Threat and Critical Control Points  5 (26.3) 
United States Pharmacopeia (USP) Food Fraud Mitigation 0 
Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE) Vulnerability 
Assessment Tool 
2 (10.5) 
Food Fraud Initial Screening Tool 0 
In-house assessment tool (e.g. own bespoke / adapted tools) 7 (36.8) 
Others (e.g. product testing) 5 (26.3) 
  
*Sources of information used to support food fraud assessments  
Guidelines provided by assessment method 9 (47.4) 
Internal experts 12 (63.2) 
External experts 5 (26.3) 
Food safety certification bodies 6 (31.6) 
Media 4 (21.1) 
Food magazines 2 (10.5) 
Peer-reviewed journal articles 1 (5.3) 
Professional memberships 6 (31.6) 
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Academia 3 (15.8) 
Conferences 5 (26.3) 
Others 4 (21.1) 
  
*Types of food fraud assessment training conducted in the 
company 
 
Food fraud vulnerability assessment 15 (78.9) 
Laboratory and analytical instrument training 10 (52.6) 
Verification of supplier training 8 (42.1) 
Internal control measures 12 (63.2) 
Forensic accounting 2 (10.5) 
Others 2 (10.5) 
Note: * Participants can select more than one option 692 
 693 
Table 4. Actions taken post vulnerability assessment or if suspicion of fraud ariseS 694 
Items Frequency (%) 
What are your *action(s) if there is suspicion of fraud by your suppliers:  
Delist the supplier 10 (52.6) 
Work with them to eliminate the problem 7 (36.8) 
Others (e.g. investigation, supplier audits) 8 (42.1) 
  
Any non-conformances raised in audits against food fraud vulnerability 
clauses / requirements? 
 
Yes 4 (21.1) 
No 12 (63.2) 
Uncertain 3 (15.8) 
  
In your opinion, have food fraud vulnerability assessments had a positive / 
negative impact on food fraud? 
 
Positive 9 (47.4) 
Negative 2 (10.5) 
Uncertain 8 (42.1) 
Note: *Food businesses can select more than one option 695 
 696 
Table 5. Perceptions of food fraud vulnerability assessments (1 – Strongly disagree; 5 – Strongly 697 
agree) 698 
Food fraud vulnerability assessment is able to: Mean S.D. 
Trace origin of food 3.47 1.26 
Verify vendor and supplier status 3.68 1.16 
Ensure integrity of food 4.11 0.99 
Result in safer food 3.63 0.89 
Deter potential fraud risk 3.89 0.94 
Detect existing fraud 3.63 0.89 
Create anti-fraud culture 3.74 0.81 
   
External control measures   
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I feel confident that external staff / inspectors can prevent 
fraud 
3.47 1.12 
Government emphasis on fraud prevention strategies can 
prevent fraud 
3.26 1.05 
   
Internal control measures   
I feel confident that our food fraud vulnerability assessment can 
prevent fraud 
3.79 0.92 
I have internal control measures in place to prevent food fraud 4.00 0.67 
I feel confident my internal staff can prevent fraud 3.89 0.74 
   
I intend to:   
Apply food fraud vulnerability assessment (if new) N/A N/A 
Continue with my current food fraud vulnerability assessment 4.16 0.76 
Search for more information regarding food fraud vulnerability 
assessment 
3.84 0.89 
Note: N/A – Not applicable as all food businesses carry out food fraud vulnerability assessments 699 
 700 
 701 
 702 
